Affordable Mobile Everywhere in Canada – For Good

Goals

Focus on consumers, not the oligopoly. Create a fair, open market where no company can abuse its power at the expense of consumers or smaller competitors. By doing so, we will see:

• Reduced wireless costs by at least 30% within five years
• Every Canadian consumer has access to affordable wireless services

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Background and Motivation

Affordable wireless services are essential to a country’s economic success. Connecting to the internet on-the-go boosts productivity, spurs innovation, and literally saves lives. 

For decades, an entrenched telecom oligopoly has kept Canadian prices among the highest in the world. In 2023 a 10GB wireless plan costs an average of $45.43 for Canadians but only $19.08 for those in the UK¹. 

The “Big Three” (Bell, Rogers, Telus) control 80-90% of the market², facing little pressure to lower prices. Canada’s own Competition Bureau calls the Canadian wireless industry “highly concentrated, very profitable and extremely difficult to enter” – a clear sign of monopoly power at play³. 

In 2024 their average revenue per user (ARPU) was $67.41 for wireless⁴. This same figure is just CAD$28.31 in the UK⁵ and CAD$22.05 across Europe⁶.

But we can fix this, fast. The solution is more competition. When a single regional “disruptor” achieves just ~5.5% market share, local wireless prices can be pushed 35–40% lower⁷. 

Over the years, the government has made some efforts to introduce competition into both wireless and fixed internet markets. But, every time we have ended up back with consolidation into the oligopoly and a resumption of price increases. 

For example, in 2008, the government attempted to foster competition by restricting incumbent access to purchasing new spectrum, and mandating domestic roaming and infrastructure sharing. 

However, these changes didn’t go far enough. Ultimately, all of the pure play wireless new entrants that started during this period consolidated into an oligopoly:

• Public Mobile was started in 2010 and was sold to Telus in 2013
• Mobilicity was started in 2009 and was sold to Rogers in 2015
• WIND Mobile (now Freedom Mobile) was started in 2009 and sold to Shaw in 2016. Shaw was ultimately acquired by Rogers in 2023 and Freedom Mobile sold to Videotron, another oligopolist

Since then, to the government’s credit, they’ve made a number of changes to The Competition Act giving more power to regulators to control big mergers⁸.

But this is only a first step. The sky-high cost of wireless service in Canada shows that more needs to be done. We’ve seen the pattern before: new regulation spurs a brief increase in competition, new entrants are eventually sold to or suffocated by incumbents, after competition fades, prices rise. Without real reform, history will repeat itself. It’s only a matter of time.

Canada’s telecom problem is clear: prices are high, competition is weak, and consumers and small businesses are paying the price. We can effectively bring prices down by creating a pro-competition environment that introduces a new pure play wireless player, gives the regulator more power to force incumbents to open up their networks at competitive wholesale rates, and encourages real choice for consumers. In the worst case scenario, if these changes prove to not be enough to unseat oligopolistic interests, we can ensure a more fair market by splitting telecom infrastructure from retail service.

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Real-World Solutions

The UK, Australia, U.S. and New Zealand have all grappled with similar oligopolistic market dynamics, but successfully introduced reforms that brought down prices. Here are some things that have made it work:

• Pure play wireless companies – these are companies that focus exclusively on providing wireless services, including fixed wireless access (FWA).
  
  • Similar to Canada, the U.S.’s telecom landscape is dominated by a few big players (AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile). But T-Mobile, unlike incumbents tied to legacy infrastructure and bundles, has driven aggressive competition in the U.S. wireless market.
• Robust MVNO markets – Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) are carriers that use another carrier’s network instead of building their own (e.g. Mint Mobile, GoogleFi). These are generally considered the price setters in a market.
  • In the UK, dozens of MVNOs⁹ – from grocery chains to digital upstarts – offer budget plans and niche services. As of 2023, MVNOs account for roughly 18% of all UK mobile connections¹⁰, a significant share that forces the main networks to offer competitive pricing, often through their own sub-brands.
  • Recent data from the Australian regulator showed that while the major operators have been raising their flagship plan prices (e.g. median plan price rose from $50 to $58 AUD in the past two years), MVNO offerings remained much cheaper – around $30 AUD median – effectively providing a low-cost alternative for consumers​¹¹.‍
• No foreign ownership restrictions – Canada has rules in place that require the Big Three telecom companies and almost all broadcasters (which overlaps to also include the Big Three) to be Canadian owned and controlled.
  • The US has no foreign ownership restrictions, e.g. Deutsche Telekom owns a majority stake in T-Mobile US. This has increased its access to capital.
  • In 2009, a new operator, 2degrees, launched in New Zealand. 2degrees was partly financed by U.S. and Canadian investors. These investments were only possible because New Zealand removed barriers to foreign investments, which allowed the company to get financed.‍
• Explicit prioritization of new competition‍
  • New Zealand had only two mobile operators until 2009, when 2degrees entered the market. Similar to Canada in 2008, the government required incumbents to provide national roaming, ensuring 2degrees could offer coverage while building its network¹². However, the key difference is that New Zealand’s regulator retained oversight to step in if negotiations were delayed or failed. This proved critical to 2degrees’ success: it allowed the new carrier to offer nationwide coverage to subscribers from day one (roaming on Vodafone where it had no towers) while it gradually built its own network.
  • New Zealand even went one step further in 2011. Recognizing that its incumbent, Telecom New Zealand, held too much power, they required it to be split into two companies: Spark (retail service provider for mobile and broadband) and Chorus (wholesale network infrastructure for fixed lines). This separation was tied to government investment in a nationwide Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) fiber initiative. This greatly expanded competition in broadband, as dozens of companies now compete on relatively equal footing over the fiber network.

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What Needs To Be Done

Canada must take even more bold, immediate action to reform its telecommunications market. We propose the following actions:

1. Ensure a pure play, facilities-based wireless competitor is always operating – Pure play wireless companies operate inherently differently than traditional telecom companies that own fixed infrastructure and sell bundles. To ensure one can thrive:
   
   1. Auction access to spectrum through a single national licence across multiple, sufficient spectrum frequencies. If necessary, reallocate spectrum from incumbents.
   2. Fair domestic roaming (no geographic restrictions) at competitive rates.
   3. Fair access to incumbent infrastructure (e.g. tower sharing).
2. Update CRTC mandate to prioritize all types of competition – Currently, only companies with infrastructure (e.g. Cogeco, Videotron) can operate MVNOs. 
   
   1. Eliminate this requirement. Mandate that pure play reseller and MVNO markets will be open to any competitor, with no requirement for facilities ownership. Ensure equal access to infrastructure for all wholesale and retail service providers.
   2. Allow all resellers (including incumbents in geographies where they do not own facilities) to access incumbent fixed internet networks, including fibre-to-the-home.
   3. Ensure that wholesale rates preference the reseller and MVNO providers.
3. Ensure CRTC definitively resolves disputes within 90 days – The Big Three are masters at using delay tactics to stall competition. 
   
   1. CRTC to mandate and enforce a 90-day regulatory dispute resolution, which is not subject to commercial arbitration or appeals that let incumbents drag cases out.
4. Eliminate all foreign ownership restrictions
   
   1. This includes both telecommunications and broadcast restrictions.
   2. Maintain Investment Canada Act review of foreign takeovers for national security considerations.
5. Set-up a formal testing regime for new technologies – To ensure Canadians have access to the newest technologies, sandbox adequate spectrum to allow new competitors to test as a precursor to commercial roll-out.
   
   1. Create an application process that prioritizes new ideas and technologies.
      
      1. For example, allow new, proven telecommunications technologies (e.g. Starlink and other satellite providers) to be introduced into the Canadian market within 90 days of application with light touch regulation.
      2. Designate a secondary market (e.g. London, Ont.) as a sandbox market with access to sufficient spectrum and government real estate to test new technologies.
6. Mandatory garden leave
   
   1. Prohibit politicians, public sector employees that work at the telecom regulators (ISED, CRTC, etc.) and private sector employees that work in regulated companies (Rogers, Telus, Bell, etc.) from working for the other side for a minimum of two years after leaving their employ.
7. Structural separation of telecommunications infrastructure from end-user customers – If these changes are unable to achieve our targeted 30% cost reductions in five years and create a vibrant, competitive telecommunications market, then we should consider:
   
   1. Required divestiture of all fibre, copper, cable and tower assets (and related back-end infrastructure) into multiple private sector companies that are price regulated (analogous to energy distribution or other rate regulated companies that are allowed to earn a certain return on capital).
   2. These infrastructure companies would not be allowed to sell to end customers. They would be set-up to sell to wholesalers and retail service providers (see Chorus in New Zealand¹³).
   3. Equal access to infrastructure for all wholesale and retail service providers.

These measures will deliver real competition, lower prices, and better service to Canadians, ensuring that telecommunications becomes a driver—not a barrier—to economic growth.

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Common Questions

1. Won’t regulation hurt investment in telecom infrastructure?

• No. Countries with stronger competition rules—like the U.S., U.K. and Australia—have robust telecom networks and lower prices. More competition will drive investment, not discourage it.

2. Is this a handout to new entrants?

• No. New-entrants face formidable obstacles when entering a highly developed market such as Canada and it is very difficult to raise capital for these projects. We will not pick winners. For example, when auctioning a single, national spectrum licence, participation will be open to any new entrant (subject to national security reviews). 

3. Haven’t prices already started coming down?

• Any recent price drops are minimal, temporary and result primarily from Videotron’s acquisition of Freedom Mobile from Rogers/Shaw. Based on all past examples of oligopoly consolidation, we expect prices to begin increasing again in the coming years.

4. Won’t this hurt the Big Three and lead to job losses?

• A more competitive telecom market will create thousands of new jobs in technology, startups, customer service and numerous other industries. Keeping prices high only benefits executives and shareholders—not workers or consumers.

5. Doesn’t Canada face unique challenges (i.e. larger geography and smaller population size) that justify our high costs? 

• While these do present some challenges for telecom providers, these factors alone do not fully justify the significantly higher prices Canadians pay. Nations of similar sizes and population densities, e.g. Australia, are able to offer more affordable services.

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Conclusion

Half-measures have failed. It’s time for bold action to create real competition, lower prices, and better service for Canadians. By implementing these reforms, we will reduce wireless costs by at least 30% within five years, increase consumer choice, and make telecommunications a driver of economic growth rather than an obstacle. The government must act now to break the telecommunications oligopoly and ensure every Canadian has access to affordable, high-quality connectivity.

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